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DISCLAIMER 
 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an 
agency of the United States Government.  Neither the United States 
Government nor any agency Thereof, nor any of their employees, 
makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal 
liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or 
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately 
owned rights.  Reference herein to any specific commercial product, 
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or 
otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any 
agency thereof.  The views and opinions of authors expressed herein 
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Government or any agency thereof. 
DISCLAIMER 
 
Portions of this document may be illegible in 
electronic image products.  Images are produced 
from the best available original document. 
 
Lexington Project Eeport #1^3 
i# 
Title: Tolerances and Shielding Eequlrements 
Author; L. W, Nordheim 
Date: September 2, 19l|-8 
Place: Lexington 
Note: This report represents an earlier, and largely Independent, set 
of estimates such as are given in Chapter IVB, EEQUIEEMENTS. 
The following/tables^ contain a synopsis of data which are Important 
for the determination of shielding requirements. They are intended to 
permit rapid orientation in this field and to furnish a basis for compari-
son of different type crafts. Justification for and, in most cases, an 
extensive discussion of the quoted figures are given in other reports. 
(LP-126, 1F-Ik6, LP-151, and Chapter IVB of The Final Lexington Eeport.)Z 
It should be emphasized that there are serious uncertainties in many / ^ 
cases, and that considerable further experimental work would be required 
before some of the figures could be trusted. 
A, Table 1 shows the fluxes of fast neutrons and hard gamma rays 
from a completely ^ anshielded reactor of 105 kw. power output. There will 
be a partial self-shielding of the reactor which will depend on its 
structure, that is, size and composition. The most unfavorable case has 
been assumed, that is, a small fast reactor without reflector. Only fast 
neutrons and hard gamma rays are shown since they constitute the most 
deuigerous groups which are at the same time the most difficult to shield 
against. The energy escaping the reactor is also given, since it produces 
some important effects through ionization of the air aroiond the plane. 
Table 1 
Eadiatlon Fluxes from an Unshielded 10^ KW. 
Eeactor at Various Distances 
Type of Eadiatlon 
Fast Neutrons Hard Gamma Eays* 
Flux (per sq. cm. sec.) 
Distance s 1 m. 
10 m. 
1000 m. 
Energy Outflow (kw.) 
3 X 
3 X 
10' 
10I3 
lOll 
its 
0.5 X 10-
10; 
10 
10' 
Ik 
8 
1.5 X 10-
It may be added that about 10"3 of the energy outflow, i.e., 
2 X 10"5 of the pile energy, will appear as visible light. 
* Includes provision for capture gamma rays which, strictly speaking, 
are largely absent in an unshielded reactor, but Tdiich will be present 
as soon as a moderate amount of shielding is provided. 
r'' .>'*'• 
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B. Table 2 lists the tolerance doses for various sensitive com-
ponents. They are based on the maximum irradiation intensity they can 
receive without sejriously impairing their operational efficiency over a 
period of twenty-four hours. Explanatory remarks are given below the 
table. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
W 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Component 
Man 
Aerial Photographic 
Films 
Payload 
Guidance 
Eadio and Eadar 
Transmission 
Electronic 
Lubrication 
Table 2 
Permissible Eadiatlon Fluxes 
Fast Neutrons/ 
sq. cm. sec. 
2 X 
' 3 X 
equipment 
oils 
10^ 
10^ 
108 
10^1 
10^1 
Hard 
sq. 
3 
5 
Gamma Eays/ 
cm. sec. 
X 10^ 
X 10^ 
loii 
10^° 
10^1 
loii 
Energy Out 
flow kw. 
2 
2 
Eemarks: 
(l)--corresponds to 1 Eoentgen per hour. Irradiation of 25 E total 
does not produce any clinically observable effects. 
(2)—important for photo reconnaissance. Though it appears that the 
sensitivity to gamma-radiation of ciorrently used film for aerial photog-
raphy is very high, the provision of some extra shielding for it would 
not seem to create a serious difficulty. 
(3)—based on the present-day atomic bomb. The latter is fairly 
sensitive to an external flux of fast neutrons. The uncertainty here is 
rather high. 
(4)--based on star-tracking systems. Figures are very uncertain. 
Nuclear power certainly makes guidance more difficult. The limiting 
factors Bxe response of the photosensitive surface to gamma-radiation, 
and stray light from the cloud of ionization around the plane. 
(5)—the limiting factor lies in break-down of high voltage due to 
ionization; the figure is very uncertain. 
LP-li^3-3 
(6)—some components generally used cannot stand the quoted intensi-
ties. However, it is believed that substitutes can be found, that will 
stand up xmder such conditions, 
(7)—it is possible that lubricants can be fo-uad which will be able 
to stand somewhat higher radiation, or that tricks such as filtering can 
be used. 
C. Using Tables 1 and 2 we can arrive at required attenuation 
factors for the three aircraft types which are under consideration. A 
power output of 105 kw. is assumed, euad also that the most sensitive 
components are placed at a distance of 10 m. from the reactor. Only 
orders of magnitude are significant. 
Table 3 
Bequired Attenuation Factors 
Aircraft Fast Neutrons Hard Gamma Eays 
Manned 2 x lO' (man) 3 x 10 (man, film) 
Tug tow 10^ (man) 10^ (man, f i lm, in -
t e r c OffiffliuQEii « ' 
catiatl) 
Pllotless 10^ (payload) 10^-10^ (electronics, 
guidance) 
The most sensitive components which determine the attenuation 
factors are also indicated. For the t\jg-tow, man is still the deter-
mining factor, with a possibility that transmission of radio signals 
from the tug to the tow may already be impaired by the ionization around 
the plane. For a pllotless plane, the neutron tolerance is set by the 
payload, the gamma-ray tolerance in all probability by the guidance 
equipment. If star tracking can be avoided, shielding may be further 
reduced; if not, the given figure may not be even sufficient. 
It should be remarked that there is an additional problem in the 
handling on the ground of a partially shielded pleme, partic-ularly if the 
plsme or at least the reactor material Is to be recovered. In case of 
insufficient neutron shielding the airplane will acquire Induced activi-
ties. The accumulated fission products will emit, half an hour after 
shut-down, a gamma radiation of order 1^ of the intensity diiring oper-
ation, emd this activity decays only slowly with time. Even in the case 
of the tug, considerable precautions will he required for approaching the 
plane; these will have to be the more elaborate the more the shielding is 
reduced. 
A comparison of the three types considered shows that the attenuation 
factors in the manned plane are about the square of those in the tug case. 
LP-llt3-4 
The shield thickness in the latter case will thus be about one-half of 
the manned plane. It seems hardly possible, on the other hand, to reduce 
the shielding for a pllotless guided missile, carrying payload, sub-
stantially below that of the tug tow arrangement. 
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